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THE FEDERAL WATER POWER PROGRAM
GEORGE B. CLOTHIER t
In view of the recent passage of important amendments in the law
governing the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the prospects of an early
Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of its activities, some obser-
vations on the legal aspects of the Administration's water power program
may not be untimely. This does not involve, except indirectly, the eco-
nomic feasibility of government ownership, government competition, or the
"yardstick" the6ry, nor their social implications, but is confined to a survey
of the legislation on which the program is founded and the activities which
form a part of it, undertaken from the standpoint of constitutional law. A
full understanding of the subject, however, requires brief mention of the
social and economic factors which underlie it.
The President consistently subscribes to the principle that water power
is a natural resource which belongs to the people, and that its generation and
distribution is a public trust, the administration of which requires federal
control.1  In its general aspect this belief is not seriously disputed. The
controversy centers about the degree and method of control to be enforced,
and the extent to which federal agencies can engage in the utility business
in order to effect such control.
The avowed intentions of the Administration are to reduce rates and
to increase consumption.2 To this end, hydroelectric plants owned and
operated by the federal government are being set up to establish a measure,
t A. B., 1926, Swarthmore College; LL. B., i929, Harvard University; member of the
Philadelphia Bar; contributor to legal periodicals.
. President Roosevelt, speech at Bonneville, Oregon: "I don't believe that you can have
enough power for a long time to come, and the power we are developing here is going to be
power which for all times is going to be controlled by the Government." N. Y. Times, Aug.
4, 1934, at 3.
2. The President at Grand Coulee, Washington: "... we are going to see, I believe,
with our own eyes, electricity and power' made so cheap that they will become a standard
article of use, not only for agriculture and manufacturing, but also for every .home within
reach of an electric-light line." N.'Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1934, at 3.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
advance on lines already marked out by existing law. This will appear from
an analysis of the earlier acts.
The Federal Water Power Act is probably the most important statute
in the group. Its full significance and possibilities do not seem to have
been generally noticed. Various of its sections are amended by Title II of
the Public Utilities Act of 1935, but the minor purposes and effects of the
amendments clearly show that the framers of the original act were not far
behind the present Administration in their conception of the part to be
played by the federal government in the water power field. 1 The original
act sets up the Federal Power Commission and invests it with jurisdiction
over all navigable waters in and about the United States,' for the principal
purposes (i) of making investigations and recording data "concerning the
utilization of the water resources of any region to be developed," and (2)
of licensing private concerns, states and municipalities to construct, operate
and maintain dams, power-houses and similar projects as defined in the act,
for periods not to exceed fifty years, such licenses, however, to be granted
only after determination by the Commission that the particular project is
well adapted to navigation improvement, water power development, and
general public welfare in the region.19 With a familiar ring the act lays
emphasis throughout on conservation of the public interest, and specifically
forbids combinations or agreements by licensees ". . . to limit the output
of electrical energy, to restrain trade, or to fix, maintain, or increase prices
for electric energy or service ... ." 20
But in addition to licensing requirements and strict supervision of
rates, output, etc., the original act provides that the Commission may deter-
mine on investigation that a particular project should be constructed and
maintained by the United States itself, and may then report such deter-
mination with recommendations to Congress.21 That Congress is ready to
act on similar recommendations is a matter of history today. The same act
17. The numbering of paragraphs is changed, a few definitions are added or altered, and
the Commission is given increased administrative powers in the revocation of licenses and
the determination of other factual issues affecting licensees. See Sections 5, io and 24, as
amended. While the amending act necessarily sets forth at length the unchanged portions
of the sections affected, the changes are relatively few. In addition to the above, a provision
,for adding penalties to delinquencies in the payment of annual charges (Section 17 as
amended), and a provision expressly declaring unlawful the erection of unlicensed projects
(Section 23 as amended), are included.
i8. The definition of navigability, Section 3, expressly includes all navigable portions of
a river, even though navigable only after the construction of the dam, as well as all falls and
shallows which intervene between navigable parts, and also includes "such other parts of
streams as shall have been authorized by Congress for improvement by the United States or
recommended to Congress for such improvement after investigation under its authority."
As amended, Section 23 provides rather strangely that even though the stream is non-
navigable, a person planning to build upon or across it for power or reservoir purposes shall
notify the Commission, which in turn shall investigate the facts and ascertain whether or not
it is navigable. The original act made such notification discretionary.
ig. Section 4, 41 STAT. io65 (i92o), i6 U. S. C. A. §797 (927).
20. Section 10, 41 STAT. io68 (h) (i9 o), I6 U. S. C. A. § 803 (h) (1927).
21. 41 STAT. i067 (I920), I6 U. S. C. A. § Soo (,927).
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and by the producers and manufacturers of gas, which undersells electricity
in many essential services. 9 It is contended that the nation does not need
and cannot use the new power which is made available by federal projects,
present facilities being more than adequate for all reasonably anticipated
needsY°-
These extra-legal considerations are illustrative of the controversial
appeal of the problem in many and varied quarters. And while constitu-
tionality cannot theoretically be affected by proof of loss to millions of util-
ity investors or by proof of gain to millions of electric power consumers,
it is likely that the viewpoint of one or the other group will cast involuntary
weight on the scales of judicial decision.
The legislation under which the Administration's water power program
has taken shape consists chiefly of four acts: 11 (I) The Federal Water
Power Act of 192o, and its amendment of 1935; 12 (2) The Boulder Can-
yon Project Act; 13 (3) The Muscle Shoals Act, as amended; 14 (4) The
National Industrial Recovery Act (Title II). 15 The first two of these
statutes were enacted during the Wilson and Coolidge administrations, re-
spectively; only the last two are Roosevelt's. It follows that the present
Administration cannot be credited with originating the view that develop-
ment and conservation of hydroelectric power are within the scope of fed-
eral responsibility.16 The present program is in some respects merely a bold
ing the following: "An exclusively steam power generating system would with few excep-
tions prove a cheaper source of power than an exclusively water power, system, but either
used alone can not supply a market at as low a cost as an economical combination of the two
sources of power." And Thomas A. Edison is quoted as having said in 1929: "The first and
best source of power is coal."
9. See Address of H. 0. Caster, President, American Gas Association, given at Atlantic
City, N. J. N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1934, at 29.
1o. See National Coal Association, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8.
ii. In addition to the four acts named, mention should be made of the Work Relief Bill
signed by the President on April 8, 1935, properly known as the "Emergency Relief Ap-
propriation Act of 1935", P. R. No. ii, 74th Congress, Ist Sess. (I935), and of the Public
Utility Act of 1935, P. L. No. 333, 74th Congress, ist Sess. (1935). The former, so far as
the water power program is concerned, merely supplements Title II of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act by making further appropriations available for P. W. A. loans and
grants. The latter, of course, constitutes the enactment of the Administration's policy
towards the private utility industry as a whole, having particular reference to holding com-
panies. While it indirectly affects the water power program, the Wheeler-Rayburn bill can-
not be said to be a part of it, except for Title II, which consists of amendments to the Fed-
eral Water Power Act, and is discussed more fully below. Accordingly, the validity of its
other titles is not considered in this article. In another sense, the water power program,
involving as it does federal competition with private utilities, can be regarded as an indirect
attack on the industry, whereas the main sections of the Wheeler-Rayburn bill constitute
a direct frontal attack.
12. 41 STAT. i063 (192o), i6 U. S. C. A. § 791 (927), amended by Title II of the Pub-
lic Utility Act of 1935, P. L. No. 333, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935).
13. 45 STAT. 1057 (1928), 43 U. S. C. A. § 617 (Supp. 1934).
14. 48 STAT. 58 (I933), I6 U. S. C. A. § 831 (Supp. 1934), also known as the Tennessee
Valley Authority Act. Amendments to this act were signed by the President on August 3X ,
1935, P. L. No. 412, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935).
15. 48 STAT. 200 (933), 40 U. S. C. A. §4oi (Supp. 1934).
i6. See U. S. Chamber of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 8, at 87-99, for comment on the
development of federal control in this field.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
advance on lines already marked out by existing law. This will appear from
an analysis of the earlier acts.
The Federal Water Power Act is probably the most important statute
in the group. Its full significance and possibilities do not seem to have
been generally noticed. Various of its sections are amended by Title II of
the Public Utilities Act of 1935, but the minor purposes and effects of the
amendments clearly show that the framers of the original act were not far
behind the present Administration in their conception of the part to be
played by the federal government in the water power field. 17 The original
act sets up the Federal Power Commission and invests it with jurisdiction
over all navigable waters in and about the United States,18 for the principal
purposes (i) of making investigations and recording data "concerning the
utilization of the water resources of any region to be developed," and (2)
of licensing private concerns, states and municipalities to construct, operate
and maintain dams, power-houses and similar projects as defined in the act,
for periods not to exceed fifty years, such licenses, however, to be granted
only after determination by the Commission that the particular project is
well adapted to navigation improvement, water power development, and
general public welfare in the region.' 9 With a familiar ring the act lays
emphasis throughout on conservation of the public interest, and specifically
forbids combinations or agreements by licensees ". . . to limit the output
of electrical energy, to restrain trade, or to fix, maintain, or increase prices
for electric energy or service . "..."20
But in addition to licensing requirements and strict supervision of
rates, output, etc., the original act provides that the Commission may deter-
mine on investigation that a particular project should be constructed and
maintained by the United States itself, and may then report such deter-
mination with recommendations to Congress. 21  That Congress is ready to
act on similar recommendations is a matter of history today. The same act
17. The numbering of paragraphs is changed, a few definitions are added or altered, and
the Commission is given increased administrative powers in the revocation of licenses and
the determination of other factual issues affecting licensees. See Sections 5, Io and 24, as
amended. While the amending act necessarily sets forth at length the unchanged portions
of the sections affected, the changes are relatively few. In addition to the above, a provision
,for adding penalties to delinquencies in the payment of annual charges (Section 17 as
amended), and a provision expressly declaring unlawful the erection of unlicensed projects
(Section 23 as amended), are included.
18. The definition of navigability, Section 3, expressly includes all navigable portions of
a river, even though navigable only after the construction of the dam, as well as all falls and
shallows which intervene between navigable parts, and also includes "such other parts of
streams as shall have been authorized by Congress for improvement by the United States or
recommended to Congress for such improvement after investigation under its authority."
As amended, Section 23 provides rather strangely that even though the stream is non-
navigable, a person planning to build upon or across it for power or reservoir purposes shall
notify the Commission, which in turn shall investigate the facts and ascertain whether or not
it is navigable. The original act made such notification discretionary.
ig. Section 4, 41 STAT. io65 (192o), 16 U. S. C. A. §797 (1927).
2o. Section IO, 41 STAT. 1o68 (h) (ig2o), 16 U. S. C. A. § 8o3 (h) (1927).
21. 41 STAT. 1o67 (I920), I6U. S. C. A. §8oo (1927).
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further provides that, "Upon not less than two years notice in writing .
the United States shall have the right upon or after the expiration of any
license to take over and thereafter maintain and operate any project. .. " 22
Thus, the act contemplates not merely federal regulation, but also the possi-
bility of federal ownership and operation of all the substantial sources of
hydroelectric power. For fifteen years the Federal Power Commission has
been vested with almost unlimited control of the production of that power,
and the federal government has been authorized to supplant the private water
power companies when and as their licenses expire.
Indications are that the present Administration intends to take full
advantage of the Federal Water Power Act. The 1935 amendments are
sufficient evidence to that effect. The Federal Power Commission will
doubtless assume a more conspicuous place than heretofore. Only recently
it has been responsible for a number of important reports which have fur-
thered the Administration's policies in Congress and before the public gen-
erally.23  Its licensing functions, of course, will continue, and its investi-
gatory and research activities 24 may well be increased and developed to
keep pace with the water power program as a whole, if not to guide the
program's future course.
The Federal Water Power Act and the activities of the Commission
have met frequent challenge in the courts and have always survived sub-
stantially unscathed.25 In one case the following appears:
"It might be that, if Congress had adopted a plan for the sole purpose
of damming up navigable streams in order to generate and sell water
power, such an act would be in excess of the Constitution. The far-
reaching effect of such federal policy would be a departure from that
manifested by the act now under consideration. This enactment is for
the improvement of the navigability of the stream. This is the para-
mount object. But an act which could be reduced to the isolated prop-
osition that the federal government can dam up streams for the sole
purpose of generating hydro-electricity and sell the same might be
obnoxious to the organic law. I think it would be palpably in excess
of the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution." 26
Under such decisions federal regulation of the major water power projects
is assured. Construction and operation thereof by the government is ap-
22. Section 14, 41 STAT. 1071 (i92o), I6 U. S. C. A. § 8o7 (1927).
23. For instance, the much publicized memorandum submitted to the President on Jan-
uary io, 1935, to show that the utility investments of savings banks and insurance companies
are not endangered by the program.
24. The National Power Policy Committee, organized by the President, July i6, 1934,
and the Mississippi Drainage Area Board, formed by the Secretary of the Interior, Septem-
ber 26, 1933 (Public Works Administration, Press Release No. 156), may be mentioned as
sharing the function of the Federal Power Commission in this field.
25. See Henry Ford v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U. S. 369 (193o); New Jersey v.
Sargent, 269 U. S. 328 (935) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 6o6 (M. D.
Ala. 1922) ; Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 6 (W. D. Va. 1933).
26. Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 6o6, 613 (M. D. Ala. 1922).
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proved only by dictum and within the uncertain limits of incidental activity.
The Boulder Canyon Project Act also contains features which serve
conveniently as a part of the "New Deal" water power program. It was
passed allegedly "for the purpose of controlling the floods, improving navi-
gation, and regulating the flow of the Colorado River, providing for stor-
age . . . and for the generation of electrical energy as a means of making
the project herein a self-supporting and financially solvent undertak-
ing. ,,,27 and provides that the Secretary of the Interior shall be "author-
ized . . . to contract . . for . . . generation of electric energy and delivery
at the switchboard to States . . .and private corporations of electrical energy
generated at said dam, upon charges that will provide revenue which .. .
will in his judgment cover all expenses of operation and mainte-
nance. . " 28
This act, of course, has no general or national application. It deals
with a specific local project to be constructed by the federal government and
maintained for operation under federal supervision with careful regard to
an equitable distribution of the benefits achieved. Seven states are directly
affected, six of which have joined in a compact governing their rights in
the development. 29  Upon final completion, the Boulder Dam project will
have an annual capacity comparable to that of the Tennessee Valley devel-
opment, and Boulder Dam itself, which is some 766 feet in height, is larger
than any other dam so far contemplated in the water power program. The
power plant will be leased to and operated by the city of Los Angeles and
a private company, with estimated revenues sufficient to recover the invest-
ment in less than fifty years.
It is plainly the intent of the Administration to fit this vast project
into the national program as an integral part. Since the act gives no exten-
sive powers to the Department of Interior in respect to transmission and
distribution of electricity and social betterment activities in the area affected,
the project is hardly comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority. Never-
theless, in a sense it does put the government in the power business,30 and
the judicial sanction which it carries renders it extremely valuable as an
adjunct to the rest of the program. The act was sustained in its entirety
as a lawful federal enterprise for the improvement of navigation, although
27. Section 1, 45 STAT. 1057 (1928), 43 U. S. C. A. § 617 (Supp. 1934).
28. Section 5, 45 STAT. o6o (1928), 43 U. S. C. A. §617 (d) (Supp. 1934).
29. The seventh state, Arizona, not only refused to join in the compact, but called out
its militia to prevent the agents of the Department of the Interior from commencing con-
struction of the new Parker Dam, a project auxiliary to Boulder Dam on the same river.
In United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174 (I935), the Court upheld Arizona, ruling that
Congress had not authorized the auxiliary project. Such authorization is included in Section
2 of the so-called Rivers and, Harbors Bill of 1935, P. L. No. 409, 74th Cong., ist Sess.
(1935).
30. The Report of the Natural Resources Production Department of the United States
Chamber of Commerce, supra note 8, at lO9, contains the following language: "Thus in the
Boulder Canyon Project the federal government is definitely placed in the power business,
takes the initiative and competes with private business as do municipalities. . ....
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there was much to indicate that power development was the primary pur-
pose. 31 The Court simply stated: "As the river is navigable and the means
which the act provides are not unrelated to the control of navigation, the
erection and maintenance of such dam and reservoir are clearly within the
powers conferred upon Congress." 32
The Muscle Shoals Act of 1933 creates the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, which is authorized not only to build dams and produce power, but also
"to distribute and sell the surplus power generated at Muscle Shoals . . .
for the benefit of the people of the section as a whole, and particularly the
domestic and rural consumers. . . in such manner as to encourage increased
domestic and rural use of electricity." 33 Curiously enough, the declaration
of legislative purpose does not mention hydroelectric power and merely pro-
vides:
".. . for the purpose of maintaining and operating the properties now
owned by the United States in the vicinity of Muscle Shoals, Alabama,
in the interest of the national defense and for agricultural and indus-
trial development, and to improve navigation in the Tennessee River
and to control the destructive flood waters in the Tennessee River and
Mississippi River Basins, there is hereby created a body corporate by
the name of the Tennessee Valley Authority." 34
Here, as at Boulder Dam, the project is local, though vast. As on the
Colorado, but to a greater degree, a broad development of the potentialities
of the river basin is contemplated. In both projects the production of water
power appears to be the primary purpose. The essential difference, typifying
the new policies of the present Administration, lies in the fact that under
the Muscle Shoals Act the government, through the Tennessee Valley
Authority, will itself operate the generating plant, transmit and distribute
the power, and concern itself generally with rates, consumption and eco-
nomic progress throughout the area. Practically nothing is left for state
compacts or for state control.
The Muscle Shoals project contemplates a system of at least four major
dams, strategically located and inter-connected with government-built
transmission lines, which will furnish cheap power throughout the area to
municipal, industrial, domestic and rural consumers. And at the same
time the Tennessee Valley Authority is authorized and expected to promote
a general rehabilitation of the area, and a betterment of its standards of
living, by applied sociology, vocational training, and other appropriate means
to be studied and developed by government research.35
3. See Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 (93).
32. Id. at 455.
33. Section 1I, 48 STAT. 64 (933), i6 U. S. C. A. § 831 i) (Supp. 1934).
34. Section 1, 48 STAT. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 (Supp. 1934).
35. See A. E. Morgan, Bench Marks in the Tennessee Valley (Nov. 1934), 4 SURVEY
GRAiHIc 548, and also Section 22 of the Act of 1933, 48 STAr. 69 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A.
§ 831 (u) (SupP. 1934).
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The program, as actually launched by the Tennessee Valley Authority,
is far-reaching and complete, taking advantage of the broadest implications
of the language of the act. Some parts of it are not easily found among
the powers expressly granted ;36 but the general scheme is there, and appar-
ently it approaches as a model the New Deal water power program for the
entire nation. For judicial sanction the Authority can properly point to the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit,8 7 overruling
Judge Grubb of Tennessee and holding that the act is constitutional and that
the activities of the Authority are within its lawful intent.
Even Tennessee Valley Authority, however, is not wholly a New Deal
conception. Hoover and Coolidge both suggested and recommended using
the proceeds of surplus Muscle Shoals power for local research and experi-
mentation by the federal government. 88 The site of Wilson Dam was
acquired by President Wilson under the National Defense Act 39 for the
manufacture of munitions, and the hydroelectric power generated at the
dam, in excess of the requirements for operating locks, lighting government
buildings, etc., was sold to the Alabama Power Company during most of
the succeeding Republican administrations. In 1926 the United States
Government used 3,318,ooo kilowatt hours and sold 429,311,000 kilowatt
hours, evidently without serious complaint from or injury to the private
utility industry. 40 The Muscle Shoals Act is in one sense merely a disposal
by Congress of a "white elephant" left by the war.41
The fourth important statute upon which the Administration's water
power program is based is the National Industrial Recovery Act. Title II
of that act sets up the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works,
commonly known as P. W. A., and authorizes the Administrator, under
various circumstances and conditions, to construct, or make loans for the
construction of, water power projects. It provides:
"The Administrator . . .shall prepare a comprehensive program
of public works, Which shall include among other things the follow-
ing: . . . (b) conservation and development of natural resources, in-
cluding control, . . . of waters, . . . development of water power,
36. The amendments adopted on August 31, 1935, would seem to cover many of the
deficiencies alleged to exist in the original act. The powers o f the Authority are defined and
broadened along the lines discussed in the text (Sections 4j, 4k, 5c, io, i2a and 26a, as
amended or added), and its activities are placed more squarely on the ground of acknowl-
edged constitutional powers (Sections ga and 31 as added). See p. 13, infra.
37. Tennessee Valley Authority v Ashwander, 78 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
The opinion of the District Court is reported in 8 F. Supp. 893 (N. D. Ala. 1934).
38. U. S. Chamber of Commerce, op. cit. S.uPra note 8, at 135.
39. 39 STAT. 215 (i9i6), 50 U. S. C. A. § 79 (1928).
40. See Alabama v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 897, 899 (Ct. Cl. 193o), rev'd for lack of
jurisdictioM, 282 U. S. 5o2 (I93I).
41. See outline of legislative history of Muscle Shoals, prior proposals for its disposi-
tion, etc., in U. S. Chamber of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 8, c. VIII.
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transmission of electric energy, and construction of river and harbor
improvements. . . ,,; 42
and further:
"With a view to increasing employment quickly, the President is
authorized and empowered through the Administrator. . . (i) to con-
struct. . . any public works project included in the program. . . (2)
. . . to make grants to States, municipalities, or other public bodies for
the construction of any such project . . . (3) to acquire . . . real or
personal property in connection with the construction of any such
project... " 43
At least seven major water power projects are under way with funds
allotted by the Public Works Administrator under the powers delegated to
him by this act.44 The extent of these operations naturally gives rise to
the complaint that the legislative branch is relinquishing its functions
through improper delegation of powers.45  Undoubtedly the Administra-
tion is using its general powers under Title II to extend federal activity on
a nation-wide scale along lines similar to those specifically sanctioned by
Congress in the Muscle Shoals Act. Accordingly, many Public Works
Administration projects raise the same questions as to the propriety of fed-
eral activities and expenditures in the power field as are raised more directly
by the Muscle Shoals Act and the enterprises conducted thereunder.
Equally important among the powers and duties of the Public Works
Administration are those which relate to financing local public works
projects by grants and loans to states and sub-state bodies. Many such
projects, of course, have no relation to the water power program, as they
involve other forms of public works expansion, but the activities of the
Public Works Administration in co-operation with the Tennessee Valley
Authority are directly in point, and indicate a basic and far-reaching policy.
Not only have loans and grants been freely allotted to municipalities pro-
posing to purchase T. V. A. power, but also, under the general provisions
of the National Industrial Recovery Act, a corporation has been organized
with the same officers as the Tennessee Valley Authority, for the purpose
of promoting and financing the sale of electrical appliances in areas served
with T. V. A. power.46 Similar co-operation can be expected from P. W. A.
42. Section 202, 48 STAT. 201 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §4o2 (Supp. 1934).
43. See Section 2o3, 48 STAT. 203, 40 U. S. C. A. § 403 (Supp. 1934).
44. Of these the most important are probably: Grand Coulee Dam, Columbia River,
Washington; Bonneville Dam, Columbia River, Oregon; Fort Pec% Dam, Missouri River,
Montana; and Caspar-Alcova Dam on the North Platte River in Wyoming.
45. The subject of lawful and unlawful delegation of power to the Executive is not con-
sidered in this article. But it has, o~f course, already been made the ground of at least two
Supreme Court decisions invalidating New Deal legislation, in which it was easily more
apparent than in any of the legislation affecting the water power program. See Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935) ; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 55
Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
46. Electric Home and Farm Authority was established by Proclamation of the Presi-
dent on December 19, 1933, and capitalized with P. W. A. funds. ExEc. ORDER No. 6514,
Dec. I9, 1933.
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in respect to other major hydroelectric projects, in the absence at least of
an adverse Supreme Court ruling.
Neither in Title I of the N. I. R. A., nor in the Boulder Dam or
Muscle Shoals statutes, is there any clear indication of the part to be played
by the Federal Power Commission. The functions of the various bodies
set up by these acts are clearly overlapping, and conceivably conflict might
arise between the Federal Power Commission and the Public Works Ad-
ministration or the Tennessee Valley Authority. While the Commission is
given general control of water power projects on navigable streams, and
may recommend federal construction and operation to Congress, it does not
clearly have power to supervise or license government projects authorized
by act of Congress, or by agencies created by acts of Congress other than
the Water Power Act. Presumably, however, conflict will be avoided as
long as the present Administration controls, and the various bodies will co-
operate in the furtherance of the program as a whole. The Federal Power
Commission itself is bound by Section 4 of the act 47 to submit to the War
Department for approval any proposed construction which affects the navi-
gability of a river.48  It may be assumed that the Public Works Administra-
tion will approve no water power projects, especially for state, municipal or
private construction, unless first passed on by the Power Commission.
This is a brief outline of the legislation affecting the government's
water power policies. Of the four acts, two have long since been declared
constitutional in decisions specifically covering the right of the federal gov-
ernment (i) to regulate private power companies operating on navigable
streams; 49 and (2) to construct a dam on a navigable stream from which
power will be generated and sold by the government or its lessees. 50 But
this authority conclusively sustains only a small part of the program. Under
the other two acts new and important constitutional questions arise on
readily distinguishable facts.
The following are the principal water power activities of the federal
government and its agencies under the Muscle Shoals Act and under Title
II of the National Industrial Recovery Act: (a) Construction of dams,
hydroelectric power plants, and transmission lines to be owned by the fed-
eral government and operated in competition with private concerns; (b)
47. 41 STAT. io65 (1920), 16 U. S. C. A. 797 (1927).
48. Although the Federal Power Commission has jurisdiction over navigable bodies of
water in general, its primary concern is water power. Navigability, is the responsibility of
the War Department to which all river, harbor and waterway improvements materially
affecting navigability are referred. See, for instance, the Rivers and Harbors Bill of 1935.
P. L. No. 409, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935).
49. Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 6o6 (M. D. Ala. 1922); and see
Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 6 (W. D. Va. 1933), which sustains
federal control even though the project is located above the navigable portion of the stream.
It is believed that the 1935 amendments to the Federal Water Power Act raise no substantial
constitutional questions not covered by these and similar decisions.
5o. Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 (1930).
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Financing the construction of distribution systems to be operated by munici-
pal and other local governmental bodies, often in competition with private
concerns; 51 (c) Generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of elec-
tricity at wholesale and retail to public and private consumers, often in
competition with private concerns; (d) Promotion and financing of the sale
of appliances to consumers; (e) Formulation and execution of plans for
social, economic and industrial betterment in the principal project areas.
Under what circumstances and subject to what restrictions can the
federal government, or its agencies, engage in any or all of these activities?
Which of the powers expressly delegated to Congress include the above activ-
ities, or, in other words, to which of the delegated powers are any or all
of the above activities incidental? It should be borne in mind that the
activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority are carried on to some extent
on United States government land, acquired during war time for the pur-
pose of constructing nitrate plants for the manufacture of munitions; and
also that all the major dams contemplated in the program will be situated
on technically navigable streams. 52  It would therefore seem to follow that
the constitutional powers which have some bearing on the problem are the
following: (i) The Commerce Power, 3 (2) The War and Defense
Powers,5 4 (3) Control of the Public Domain,55 (4) The so-called "Gen-
eral Welfare Power." 56 An attempt will be made to show what parts of
the federal water power program, as above outlined, come within one or
the other of these powers as commonly defined.
I. The Commerce Power
The more liberal view of the commerce power construes it as extending
to any commerce or trade which "affects more states than one." The ortho-
dox view confines it to commerce involving, or immediately incidental to,
the actual moving of goods from one state to another. Under any view,
however, the control and improvement of harbors and navigable streams,
51. The policy of advancing funds for the construction of public service plants other
than systems for the distribution of hydroelectric power originating at federal projects, ties
in closely with, although it is not a part of, the water power program.
52. For purposes of federal jurisdiction navigability need not exist at the point where the
dam is being constructed. See Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 6 (W.
D. Va. 1933), cited note 49, supra.
53. "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." U. S. Co.NsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. "To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for
a longer term than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces; . . . To provide for organizing,
arming and disciplining the militia. . . ." U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13, 14, 16.
55. "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States .. " U. S.
CoNsT. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
56. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises,
to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States. . ." U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. i.
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over which interstate or foreign transportation moves, are within the com-
merce power.57 River dams are often built to maintain or improve navi-
gability, and always involve the storage of vast quantities of water with
resultant potential power.
It has long been established in this country that a state government,
not authorized to engage directly in the business of selling power, may
nevertheless, upon construction of a dam in the exercise of a recognized
power, dispose by sale of such incidental excess as might otherwise be
wasted. Thus, the Supreme Court held in Kaukauna Water Power Co. v.
Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co.: '
"But if, in the erection of a public dam for a recognized public pur-
pose, there is necessarily produced a surplus of water, which may
properly be used for manufacturing purposes, there is no sound reason
why the state may not retain to itself the power of controlling or dis-
posing of such water as an incident of its right to make such im-
provement.
The true distinction seems to be between cases where the dam is
erected for the express or apparent purpose of obtaining a water power
to lease to private individuals, or where in building a dam for a public
improvement a wholly unnecessary excess of water is created, and
cases where the surplus is a mere incident to the public improvement
and a reasonable provision for securing an adequate supply of water
at all times for such improvement."
Here the Court draws a sound and logical distinction of fact, but un-
fortunately the issue to which it applies is apt to be confused by political
and economic factors or by the judicial policy of ignoring the motives of
the legislature. Such a distinction serves in later decisions as a ready means
of conferring judicial approval by indirection on unauthorized acts or activ-
ities, without setting a precedent which has to be reversed in the event of a
subsequent change of mind. Few courts are above indulging to this extent
in intellectual prevarication, if satisfied at the time that the unauthorized
activity is beneficial. Thus the Supreme Court was content to overlook a
great deal of evidence before concluding as follows with respect to Boulder
Canyon Dam:
".. . the fact that purposes other than navigation will also be served
cannot invalidate the exercise of the authority conferred, even if those
other purposes would not alone have justified an exercise of Congres-
sional power. . . This court may not assume that Congress had no
57. Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 379 (1877) ; Gibson v. United States, 66 U. S. 269
(1897) ; and see authorities cited in United States v. West Virginia, 55 Sup. Ct. 641 (1935).
58. 142 U. S. 254, 273 (1891).
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purpose to aid navigation, and that its real intention was that the stored
water shall be so used as to defeat the declared primary purpose." 59
In the face of the Administration's declared primary purpose of manu-
facturing and distributing cheap electricity, the doctrine of surplus power
seems highly artificial as a means of reconciling the activities in question
with the commerce power. Nevertheless, it could be made to serve that
end as to a part of the present water power program, for many of the
projects will benefit navigation and most of them are situated on navigable
streams. The cited statutes are drawn carefully so as to include in the ex-
pression of legislative intent the advancement of navigation or the improve-
ment of rivers. An excellent example is contained in Section 5 of the
amendments to the Muscle Shoals Act, which adds a new Section 9a to the
original act, as follows:
"SEc. 9a. The Board is hereby directed in the operation of any
dam or reservoir in its possession and control to regulate the stream
flow primarily for the purposes of promoting navigation and controlling
floods. So far as may be consistent with such purposes, the Board is
authorized to provide and operate facilities for the generation of elec-
tric energy at any such dam for the use of the Corporation and for
the use of the United States or any agency thereof, and the Board is
further authorized, whenever an opportunity is afforded, to provide
and operate facilities for the generation of electric energy in order to
avoid the waste of water power, to transmit and market such power as
in this act provided, and thereby, so far as may be practicable, to assist
in liquidating the cost or aid in the maintenance of the projects of the
Authority." 60
But constitutionality on this ground remains uncertain until established
in each case, because it rests on a question of fact, and the Supreme Court
may always, without reversing itself, reach an adverse conclusion on the
record before it. There was ample on the record in the Boulder Canyon
case,61 as there will be in the Tennessee Valley cases, to warrant the con-
clusion that improvement of navigation was a minor and incidental pur-
pose in the construction of the dam.
The conservative view is ably expressed in the opinion of Judge Grubb
in the case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority6 2 already referred
to. He holds it to be obvious from the evidence presented that the Author-
59. Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 456 (ig31). There was before the Court, inter
alia, article IV of the Colorado River Compact [H. R. Doc. No. 6o5, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.,
Ser. No. 8215 (1923) Io], which declared the River no longer navigable, and to which the
Act was expressly subject.
6o. P. L. No. 412, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) § 9 (a).
61. Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 (1930).
62. 8 F. Supp. 893, 896 (N. D. Ala. 1934), cited note 37, supra.
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ity was created for the principal purpose of producing and distributing elec-
tricity in competition with private utilities, any improvement in navigation
or promotion of national defense being definitely subordinate and incidental
to the principal purpose. His conclusions are persuasive, but may be
avoided on perfectly plausible grounds, as illustrated in the opinion over-
ruling him, which holds that as the dam itself was lawfully erected and
bears a reasonable relation to possible war-time requirements as well as to
the improvement of navigation, the right to dispose of its surplus power
should not be limited to such as might be accidentally or unintentionally
produced, for the surplus power is government property within the control
of Congress and must either be wasted or used. The opinion contains this
language: "The Government of the United States cannot engage at will in
private business, but it by no means follows that it cannot sell property
which it owns, even though in doing so it may enter into competition with
other public or private owners of property." 63
But even on the broadest interpretation of the surplus water power
theory, it is difficult to find authority for the federal government's retail
distribution of electricity or transmission thereof to distant markets. Spe-
cific powers of this nature granted to the Tennessee Valley Authority can
hardly be termed necessary incidents of the disposal of surplus water power.
As pointed out by James M. Beck and Newton D. Baker, there must be
some limit to the pyramiding of one incidental power upon another.6 4 Since
the constitutionality of selling water power at all depends upon its being
a mere incident of navigation improvement, national defense, or some
other plainly granted power, it should take place no farther than necessary,
geographically, from the project built in exercise of the granted power. In
other words, it may fairly be said that activities incidental to an incidental
power are not truly incidental to the original power, if they extend to areas
otherwise untouched by the exercise of the original power.
The fact that much of the power generated at Muscle Shoals, and at
other federal projects, is being or will be conveyed across state lines can
have no bearing on the power of the federal government to own and oper-
ate the means of its conveyance, or engage in the business of conveying it.
The commerce clause can hardly be construed as authority to the federal
government to engage in every business conducted across state lines.
Thus, with respect to the construction of dams and hydroelectric power
plants, with respect to some incidental transmission of electricity, and with
respect to the sale to public or private consumers, at or near source, of the
electricity generated at such plants, there is a possible but artificial justifica-
tion under the commerce clause. Distribution and sale of electricity at retail
63. U. S. L. Week, July 23, 1935, at lo66 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
64. BECK AND BAxER, OPINION RENDERED TO MR. THOMAS N. McCARTER, PRESIDENT OF
THE EDISON ELEcTRrc INSTITUTE (1934) 44, 45.
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after transmission over long distances, and promotional activities in gen-
eral would seem to be outside the scope even of that doubtful rule.
The interstate commerce conception has possible bearing on another
phase of the water power program, namely, loans and grants by the Public
Works Administration on behalf of local public service projects. Such
projects, whether municipal or state-owned, are almost invariably wholly
intrastate. The question is then raised whether federal funds can properly
be devoted to them. As already indicated, the crossing of state lines does
not give the federal government power to engage in the utility business. But
where the federal government merely lends or gives to some other body
the money with which a public service project is constructed, the fact that
the project will or will not operate across state lines may be said to affect
the question of whether the federal appropriation is in furtherance of inter-
state commerce. If purely intrastate, as is usually the case, constitutionality
of the loan or grant must rest on some other ground. In the Concordia Case,
which was one of the first decisions on this phase of New Deal activity, the
court said of Title II of the N. I. R. A.: "The Congress only intended to
promote and aid instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . it would
have no authority to grant aid to the construction of a plant over which
it would have no legislative authority." 65 But it is most unlikely that Con-
gress intended to limit the Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works to loans for the construction of interstate projects. Those charged
with the administration of the act have certainly adopted a much broader
view, and they would seem to be justified by its language.
The real significance of the commerce clause to the present problem
is in the situations where federal agencies participate directly in water power
development. Artificiality pervades its application even there, for to con-
ceive of these huge hydroelectric power plants, which sell to, and in com-
petition with, private utilities, as proper enterprises of the federal gov-
ernment, merely because of the effect of the dam on river navigation, is
difficult to say the least. But from the point of view of the constitutional
lawyer, such a conception is perfectly natural. And historically it is true
that most of the federal government's activity in the water power field
results solely from the fact that potential hydroelectric power is a necessary
incident in the damming of a navigable stream.
II. National Defense
Section 124 of the National Defense Act of 1917 60 empowered Pres-
ident Wilson to manufacture "nitrates and other products for munitions
of war" by "water power or any other power" and to "construct, maintain
65. Missouri Public Service Co. v. City of Concordia, 8 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
66. 39 STAT. 215 (I916), 5O U. S. C. A. § 79 (igi6).
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and operate" on a site or sites to be chosen by him "dams . . . power
houses," or other plants "for the generation of electrical or other power."
It provides: "The products of such plants shall be used .. . for military
and naval purposes to the extent. . necessary, and any surplus. . . not
required shall be sold and disposed of . .. ."
By authority of these provisions, Wilson Dam was constructed at
Muscle Shoals to supply power to two large nitrate plants adjoining it. No
possible question could be raised as to the constitutionality of the act and
of this execution of its mandate. The end of every war leaves in govern-
ment hands a multitude of instrumentalities of emergency, of which the
government divests itself as rapidly as possible, consistent with economy
and good sense. Some activities assumed during war time are justifiably
retained as peace time functions in the interest of national defense. Arse-
nals, shipyards, airplane factories and factories for the production of uni-
forms and equipment are not necessarily shut down when hostilities termi-
nate. Some attempts were made to dispose of the Muscle Shoals plants.
6 7
Certainly, pending such negotiations and for a reasonable number of years
after the war, the constitutionality of owning, operating and disposing of
the power generated at this dam was clear as an incident of a wartime
activity.
It also seems clear that the federal government would have the consti-
tutional power to retain the nitrate plants and the hydroelectric plant during
peacetime as an adjunct of the War Department. A steam electric power
plant can, of course, be controlled in its production of power, and if the
power plant at an arsenal or navy yard factory should attempt to sell elec-
tricity in competition with the local public service company, just criticism
would follow. But hydroelectric power production depends on the flow of
the river, which cannot be turned on and off. The disposition by sale or
lease of the excess which would otherwise be wasted is not difficult to defend
as incidental to the acknowledged defense powers. This view is developed
in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Ashwander, as follows:
"Water power is property sui generis; unlike most other forms of prop-
erty it cannot be put away and kept for future use or sale, but it must
be either converted into electricity and used up as it is released from
storage or allowed to go to waste. . . . As a practical matter, there
would be no market for the incidental or accidental surplus created in
the honest effort to produce only enough electricity to supply strictly
governmental requirements; for no user, public or private, of elec-
tricity would become a customer unless assurance could be given of a
firm and dependable supply." 68
67. U. S. Chamber of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 8, c. VIII.
68. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Ashwander, 78 F. (2d) 578, 581 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
(C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
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Following the close of the war, the surplus output of Muscle Shoals
was disposed of to the Alabama Power Company. This was doubtless
regarded as a temporary measure pending disposition of the plant itself.
The figures show how small a proportion of the output was necessary for
maintenance of the government properties. 69 The largest part passed into
direct competition with steam electric and other power sources to which the
Alabama Power Company must otherwise have resorted.
The Muscle Shoals Act is the disposition of these properties finally
determined on by Congress. Perhaps because private offers were inade-
quate, perhaps for other reasons, retention and expansion was the policy
adopted. Thus, in addition to the commerce clause, the government has
the national defense power as authority for the disposal of surplus elec-
tricity from at least one of the Muscle Shoals dams. But the scope of
activities so authorized would seem to be restricted in just the same way
as under the commerce clause. Transmission to, and distribution at, dis-
tant markets are not truly incidental to the granted power. Moreover,
the Tennessee Valley project is obviously not in fact an exercise of the de-
fense power, whatever its history may have been, any more than it is a project
for the improvement of navigation. The production and sale of power
are plainly its principal objects today.
In 1927 the sale of 99 per cent of the power produced to a private
company was perhaps still a mere incident of the execution of the National
Defense Act. But having adopted in 1933 a permanent Muscle Shoals
policy "in the interest of national defense" and "to improve navigation in
the Tennessee River," the sale of a similar bercentage of the output as sur-
plus power casts doubt on the sincerity of Congress in its expression of
legislative intent. The national defense power adds cumulative effect to
the conclusions reached with respect to the commerce clause. Neither one
nor the other can justify the whole program, or even the whole program
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, without flagrant disregard of the facts.
III. Control of the Public Domain
With respect to some of the important federal projects it will be con-
tended that the overnment is merely exercising its proprietary powers over
the public domain. Aside from the merits of this contention, its relevancy
depends, of course, primarily on whether the dam site is federal property,
but secondly, on how and why it became so.
Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution provides: "The Congress
shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the lnited States."
Public domain is acquired by various means, including conquest, treaty,
69. See Alabama v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 897-898 (Ct. Cl. ig3o), rev'd for lack of
iutrsdctio, 282 U. S. 502 (1931).
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purchase, condemnation, foreclosure, and tax sale. Acquisition by con-
demnation or by private purchase normally relates to a specific and limited
use. Post offices and penitentiaries are familiar examples. But acquisi-
tion by other means, as in the case of new territory, adds property to the
public domain for any such use or disposition as may be lawful.
The site of Muscle Shoals dam was acquired for a specific constitu-
tional purpose. With the cessation of hostilities the occasion for accom-
plishing that purpose in large measure disappeared. To this extent the orig-
inal use for the property so acquired was abandoned, and the federal gov-
ernment was left in possession of a considerable plant no longer assigned
to any particular use.
In such and similar cases, if any, there is room for argument that the
government's power over the property in question is the same as over new
territory, or over land acquired for taxes. As to Boulder Dam, and such
other sites as may be acquired by federal agencies under the direction of the
Public Works Administration, the situation is somewhat different, for the
acts applicable to those projects state the purposes of acquisition and would
seem to limit the use of land so acquired to those specific purposes. Only
abandonment of those purposes by necessity and the passage of further leg-
islation putting such land to new uses, would raise the same problem as
applies to the Tennessee Valley Authority. Certainly it is clear that the
power of the federal government to engage in a particular activity cannot
be increased by the acquisition of real estate for the purpose of conducting it.
It follows that at most only a small part of the federal water power
program can be based, for constitutionality, on control of the public domain.
As to that part, the real question is whether land acquired by the federal
government without restriction as to purpose, or for a purpose since aban-
doned, can be used by the federal government for a purpose for which it
could not in the first instance have been expressly acquired. In other words,
to what extent does federal proprietorship in the public domain attract spe-
cial incidents or powers not delegated to Congress otherwise than by Article
IV, Section 3, as quoted above.
The cases contain broad language interpreting this section of the con-
stitution. The following excerpts will illustrate:
"It may deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal
with his farming property." 70
it.*. Congress not only has legislative power over the public domain,
but it also exercises the powers of the proprietor therein." 71
"Congress . . . was authorized to deal with it as a private indi-
vidual may deal with land owned by him." 72
70. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 524 (1897).
71. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 474 (1914).
72. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 297 (1929).
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But the context from which these quotations are removed destroys much
of their strength as applied to the present problem. While the federal gov-
ernment has a free hand to control or prevent exploitation of the public
domain, having powers at least equal to those of private owners to this gen-
eral end, it cannot by mere virtue of title make use of property for any pur-
pose whatsoever, governmental or not.
Many of the cases construing Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitu-
tion, arose in the development of new territory in the West during the latter
part of the last century. Plot sections of prairie land were sold on express
condition that no part of the public domain should be fenced in or enclosed,
the purpose being to conserve those areas as open ranges for sheep and
cattl% grazing. To further this policy it was customary to sell to private
persons only the alternate sections, so that each private section or square
was bounded by four public sections, and vice versa, similar to the arrange-
ment of a checkerboard. In one case 73 it was argued by private owners
of such sections that sheep grazing from adjoining sections of the public
domain ruined the range for cattle. The Supreme Court held that the fed-
eral government was within its rights in demanding that open grazing con-
tinue in certain areas, and that private persons acquiring land in those areas
had no right to complain. Some years later, an ingenious settler, owning
the private sections of a considerable range, attempted to evade the enclo-
sure prohibition by placing fences just inside the property line of the alter-
nate sections bounding the range, which resulted in sufficient obstruction to
effect his general purpose. The federal government was sustained in order-
ing the removal of the fences. 7 4 On the other hand, where public lands were
held as forest reserves, not open for grazing without permit, the federal
government was able to enjoin citizens from putting their cattle to graze
at nearby points, in view of the fact that the cattle would trespass. 75
In one case, where it was held that local taxes on land acquired and
held by the federal government for non-payment of federal taxes would be
improper, the Court said:
"The United States do not and cannot hold property, as a mon-
arch may, for private or personal purposes. All the property and rev-
73. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U. S. 320 (189o).
74. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (i8W).
75. Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523 (91o). In other cases the power of Congress
over the public domain has been cited in connection with the powers of the Senate Committee
investigating a private lease of naval oil reserves, Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263
(1929), the power of the Executive, without specific Congressional sanction, to direct the
withdrawal of such reserves from public acquisition, United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U. S. 459 (1914), and the power of Congress to dispose by appropriation, in accordance with
public interest, of non-navigable waters on the public domain, so that riparian owners with
title through patent or public grant were subject in their use of such water to the provisions
of the Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877, c. ioT, Section 1, 43 U. S. C. A. 321 (1928), Cali-
fornia Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142 (935).
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enues of the United States must be held and applied, as all taxes, du-
ties, imposts, and excises must be laid and collected 'to pay the debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States.' " 76
This language can be regarded as expressing the true qualification to which
all statements comparing the federal proprietorship to private ownership are
necessarily subject. Broad statements of such a comparison usually occur
in cases where a public purpose in the proposed use of land is obvious. And
more particularly, the cases bring out that any public use which may be
made of the public domain must be confined closely to its borders, urnles
such use, and the activities thereunder, are within some other granted power.
There is no reason to regard as justifiable an activity which originates on
public land, but has its principal effects in the neighboring states.
Even the combination of federal ownership of large areas of land in
a particular vicinity, and an acute reclamation or flood control problem
which the separate states are unable to solve, does not enlarge the enumer-
ated federal powers. In Kansas v. Colorado,77 where the two states in
question were disputing their respective rights in the flow of a river which
both needed badly for irrigation, and where a large part of the arid land
was public domain, the Supreme Court held that the federal government,
intervenor in the action, would be without power to assume control of
reclamation of the watershed or to supersede the state governments with
its own legislation. The Court said: "But as our national territory has been
enlarged, we have within our borders extensive tracts of arid lands, which
ought to be reclaimed, and it may well be that no power is adequate for
their reclamation other than that of the federal government. But if no such
power has been granted, none can be exercised." 78
This decision bears an interesting analogy to one aspect of the Ten-
nessee Valley situation. Does the need for development and reclamation
of the Tennessee watershed, coupled with federal ownership of land therein,
warrant federal intervention to handle the problem as a whole? The ortho-
dox answer would seem to be "no"; and this should apply generally to
situations where flood control and reclamation are spoken of as established
federal powers.
Control over the public domain carries with it a wide range of incidental
powers, dependent on the purposes for which, and the means by which, the
land in question was acquired, but those powers are almost wholly confined
in activities local to the area in question. The ownership of land does not
empower the federal government to use such land as headquarters from
76. Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U. S. 151, 158 (1886).
77. 206 U. S. 46 (19o6).
78. Id. at 91.
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which to conduct activities beyond the public domain that are not author-
ized otherwise than by Article IV, Section 3.79
It may be observed in passing that Article IV, Section 3, is mentioned
in a somewhat unusual connection in the Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion
in the Ashwander Case.s° The court suggests at one point that the federal
government has merely chosen Tennessee Valley Authority as a means of
disposing of certain of its personal property, namely, water power, within
the powers of disposition conferred by that clause of the Constitution. The
decision was based on other and stronger grounds, but the court's suggestion
is worthy of comment. Certainly Congress has power to "dispose of" and
"to make all needful rules and regulations respecting" both real and personal
property which belongs to the federal government; but the question is rather
whether Congress is acting within its powers when it launches a program
for the production of personal property (water power) for sale to the pub-
lic in competition with private industry. Personal property lawfully acquired
or produced, such as surplus army supplies, may lawfully be sold. It does
not follow, however, that the sale of T. V. A. power is constitutional, unless
it is established that such power is being lawfully acquired or produced by
the federal government.
IV. The General Welfare Clause
To conceive within the Constitution a field for the exercise of federal
legislative power as broad as the words "general welfare" imply, is to con-
ceive a new form of government. If the Tenth Amendment means what it
says, and can still be enforced, Congress surely does not have power to
legislate on any subject designed to promote "the general welfare of the
United States." Whether it should have, or ever will have, such powers, is
not a subject for discussion in this article.
79. In Alabama v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 897 (Ct. Cl. I93O), cited notes 40 and 69,
supra, which was reversed, 282 U. S. 502 (I93i), because of lack of jurisdiction in the Court
of Claims, that court considered whether or not the sale of surplus Muscle Shoals power by
the federal government was taxable by the State of Alabama as a proprietary or private
activity. The majority concluded that such sale, as authorized by Congress, constituted a
public or governmental activity, exempt from tax. One judge, specially concurring, wrote
as follows: ". . . if the national government was engaged in a business of creating and
selling electric power for all persons who should apply therefor and not simply disposing of
surplus power for which it had no use and which would otherwise go to waste, by a sale or
lease to a single company, . . . a very different situation would be presented, for, in my
judgment, it would not be carrying out any governmental function or doing any act which was
necessary in order that a governmental function might be fully exercised." At 9o6. The
able opinions in that case suggest that federal power to act in a proprietary capacity is lim-
ited and that even in controlling the public domain the government acts really in its public or
governmental capacity.
So. The following sentence appears in the opinion: "Congress, in the exercise of its
power, under article 4, § 3, cl. 2, of the Constitution, to dispose o~f property belonging to
the United States, may dispose of water power created at Wilson Dam as freely as it may of
any other government property." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Ashwander,-78 F. (2d) 578
(C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
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An unfortunate opportunity for misinterpretation inheres in the lan-
guage of Article I, Section 8 of Constitution: "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect, taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States." The beginning and end of this paragraph clearly label it
as a grant of taxing power. An examination of the succeeding paragraphs
of Section 8 of Article I indicates that each embraces only one power. A
fair interpretation of the first paragraph would therefore be to give to the
phrase "to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and gen-
eral welfare of the United States" an adverbial effect as though prefixed
by "in order to" or some similar phrase. Only by strained reasoning can
there be found a distinct grant of power to engage in general welfare activ-
ities.
Even after establishing this restriction, the paragraph in question lends
itself to various constructions. Doubtless the power to tax for certain
purposes includes, and in fact means, the power to tax and then to appro-
priate in furtherance of those purposes. The first question is whether
"common defense and general welfare' include purposes other than those
specified in the succeeding clauses of Article I, Section 8, or elsewhere in
the Constitution, so that taxes may be levied to finance or subsidize activities
in which the federal government cannot itself engage. Both sides of this
question have been urged, but for the most part by commentators rather
than by judges. The strict view is generally attributed to James Madison 81
and the more liberal view to Alexander Hamilton.8 2 It would be difficult to
say which view is prevailing. 3 But one thing is quite clear, namely, that
even after giving full weight to the incidental 84 and emergency powers of
Congress, it would be impossible to fit all the recent objects of federal appro-
priation within a strict interpretation of the powers enumerated in the other
sections and clauses of the Constitution. 5  Thus, a strict interpretation of
the general welfare clause necessitates a loose interpretation of the succeed-
ing clauses of Article I, Section 8. Otherwise a great many federal appro-
priations would be manifestly unconstitutional.
But going further and assuming the so-called Hamiltonian view as
correct, what practical limitation would there be upon federal activities under
81. THE FEDERALIST, NO. 41.
82. See 4 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Lodge ed. 19o4) 150-152.
83. For the stricter view: I TucKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1899)
§ 224; LANDOW, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1889) §§ 143 ff. For the
more liberal view: I HARE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1889) §§ 242 if.; I STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 19o5) §§ 921 ff.
84. "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of
the United States, or any department or officer thereof." U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. I8.
85. Cf. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934) 151, 152.
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this power to tax and appropriate? By carefully drafted appropriation bills
any activity which Congress determines to subsidize for the purpose of pro-
moting "general welfare" might be regulated and controlled as though
within the powers specifically granted. The difficulty is that the distinction
between the power to legislate on a certain subject and the power to appro-
priate for it, is narrow if existent at all.
One clear-cut factor upon which a distinction could and should be based,
is whether or not the beneficiary of the appropriation is a federal department
or agency. If it is, and assuming the activity in question to be one in which
the federal government could not engage unless by virtue of this clause, it
is submitted that the appropriation does not fall within the general welfare
spending power. A further or alternative delimitation of the power can
be based on the extent to which the grant of funds, rather than federal con-
trol or management of the activity in which the funds are to be spent, is
predominant in the legislative purpose. Such a standard is obviously vague
and would be difficult to enforce with any degree of realism, as long as courts
accept declarations of legislative intent at face value. But some such stand-
ard would seem essential to any rational use of the more liberal view of the
spending power created by the general welfare clause.
One of the most peculiar features of the general welfare clause is the
studied consistency with which the United States Supreme Court has
ignored it, regardless of arguments of counsel addressed directly to it.86 In
numerous cases the federal activity under attack has no place in the con-
stitutional scheme unless, in order to render applicable a granted power
which is not in point except incidentally or by fiction, the obvious motives
of Congress are disregarded, or unless a power to legislate by appropriation
for the general welfare is supposed to exist unrestricted. The latter ap-
proach would appear more direct, and intellectually more honest, assuming
the result to be the same. However, since the Supreme Court has never
seen fit to express or adopt a construction of the clause in question which
would establish the existence of such a power, although in numerous cases
it would have been extremely convenient for it to have done so, there is
much to be said for the view, as expressed by Madison, that the taxing and
spending power extends only to such matters of common defense and gen-
eral welfare as are entrusted to the federal government by the more specific
provisions of the Constitution. In any event, a Supreme Court pronounce-
ment on the meaning of the general welfare clause would be welcome from
many points of view.
In the lower courts only four cases have been found dealing fully with
the scope of this clause. All of them are District Court cases, one from
86. Nicholson, The Federal Spending Power (1934), 9 TEv =, L. Q. 3, 8, 14; Note
(1934) 48 HARv. L. REv. 89, 94; cf. Missouri Utilities Co. v. City of California, 8 F. Supp.
454, 462 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
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Missouri decided in 1898,87 and the others from Missouri, 88 Idaho 89 and
South Carolina 90 decided recently as a result of New Deal legislation. In
the early case, which involved the power of the federal government to reg-
ulate and inspect slaughter houses in Missouri, the court followed Madison,
confining the phrase "common defense and general welfare" to the activ-
ities and purposes embraced by the other granted powers. In so holding, it
expressly rejected the contention that a general welfare power existed out-
side of the taxing and tax-spending power. In the three recent cases the
latter contention is not advanced; no more is claimed for the clause than a
statement of the boundaries of the spending power. But the three cases
are in direct conflict as to where those boundaries lie.
In the City of California Case,9 Judge Otis sustained the legality of
P. W. A. loans and grants for the construction of municipal power plants,
on the theory that the federal government can spend or lend for any pur-
pose reasonably calculated, of itself or in conjunction with other elements
of a national plan, to promote general welfare or relieve a general crisis.
The opinion is elaborate and carefully considered. The court said:
"My conclusion is that the Congress has the power to appropriate
money for the promotion of the general welfare and that it is not re-
stricted in so doing to objects germane to its other delegated powers.
Congress therefore has the power to appropriate money for the relief
of any condition of unemployment which is not merely local but is
national in its extent and hence inimical to the general welfare." 92
On the other hand, Judge Cavanah of Idaho concluded that the specifi-
cally enumerated powers delimit the spending power, leaving no constitu-
tional ground for P. W. A. loans and grants to projects over which the
federal government has no legislative power or control. This language
appears in his opinion:
"... if Congress is not authorized to legislate upon a certain subject-
matter, then it would follow that it may not appropriate money to carry
out such unauthorized subject-matter. It certainly would not have
power in the first instance to authorize the Administrator to construct
the system in the city of Coeur d'Alene, and, if so, then an attempt
to appropriate money for the city to do so would be indirectly exer-
cising a power it did not have." 9'
Similarly, Judge Watkins of South Carolina rejected the so-called
iamiltonian view of the general welfare clause, and found expressly that
87. United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425 (W. D. Mo. 1898).
88. Missouri Utilities Co. v. City of California, 8 F. Supp. 454 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
89. Washington Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263 (D. Idaho 1934).
go. Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 1O F. Supp. 854 (W. D. S. C. 1935).
91. 8 F. Supp. 454 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
92. Id. at 463.
93. Washington Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263, 270 (D. Idaho
1934) ; cf. Missouri Public Service Co. v. City of Concordia, 8 F. Supp. i (W. D. Mo. 1934).
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the power of appropriation of federal taxes was limited to the furtherance
of the specific powers granted in subsequent clauses of Article I, Section
8, and elsewhere in the Constitution. He held that neither the commerce
power nor the taxing and spending power is a justification for P. W. A.
loans in aid of local projects. He stated:
"Congress may not legislate either for the establishment or the support
of such local enterprises under the guise of general welfare. To per-
mit this to be done would be to destroy the barriers provided in specific
sections of the Constitution against congressional encroachment upon
states rights and local self-government." 94
Serious doubt must continue to prevail as to the real meaning of the
general welfare clause. Surely, however, the construction of dams, trans-
mission lines, and distribution systems, and the generation and distribution
of power by federal agencies, although financed by appropriation of federal
funds, are not within the general welfare power under any view authori-
tatively expressed up to the present time. Obviously, such activities are not
the normal incidents of the taxing power. Appropriations are necessarily
involved, but the paramount feature is federal production and disposition of
hydroelectric power, which would seem to require separate and specific con-
stitutional sanction, apart from the power to spend.
An important part of this water power program consists, however, in
financing the construction of local plants and distribution systems by lesser
governmental bodies. While P. W. A. loans and grants for local public
works are not always, or even usually, related to water power projects,9"
such financing does in many instances play a part in the water power pro-
gram, as is witnessed in connection with the Tennessee Valley Authority
project; 90 and when other federal projects come into full operation, P. W.
A. will doubtless co-operate by assisting prospective municipal customers.
All such financing is to be distinguished from expenditures or advances
in furtherance of the instrumentalities by which conceded federal powers
are exercised. For instance, mail subsidies under the post office power, rail
subsidies or loans under the interstate commerce power, and loans to muni-
tions manufacturers and shipyards during war time, or to national banks
94. Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, io F. Supp. 854, 869 (W. D. S. C. 1935),
cited note go, supra.
95. In Washington Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263 (D. Idaho
x934), cited note 89, supra, the complaining private utilityl distributed hydroelectric power,
but the proposed municipal plant was to be operated by Diesel engines. Also, in Missouri
Utilities Co. v. City of California, 8 F. Supp. 454 (W. D. Mo. 1934), cited note 88, supra,
and in Missouri Public Service Co. v. City of Concordia, 8 F. Supp. x (W. D. Mo. 1934),
there is nothing to indicate that the purpose of the subsidy is in any way related to a federal
water power project. See also City of Allegan v. Consumers Power Co., 71 F. (2d) 477 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1934).
96. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 8 F. Supp. 893 (N. D. Ala. i934),
reild, 78 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 5th, i935); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, io F.
Supp. 854 (W. D. S. C. x935).
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in the midst of economic stress, can all be easily sustained. But even where
no similarly direct connection with an enumerated power is to be found, it
is often impossible to secure a judicial test of federal authority, because all
persons affected otherwise than remotely are apt to be benefited. In con-
sequence the federal government exercises a broad, practical spending power
which needs no constitutional sanction. So far, however, as such a power
may be said to exist by virtue of the absence of challenge, it is clearly unavail-
able to sustain P. W. A. loans for the construction of municipal public
works. The private utilities and their stockholders are complaining vocif-
erously and have been able in various instances 97 to establish legal grounds
of complaint, other than merely as federal taxpayers, a status which has
been held of itself insufficient. 98
Such complaint rests not merely on the fact of subsidized municipal
competition in the face of an exclusive franchise (public service franchises
are usually exclusive only as against private competitors 19), but rather on
illegality inherent in the municipal project by reason of the federal gov-
ernment's participation therein. As to P. W. A. loans for any local project,
it may be contended that the spending power has been exceeded, if the fed-
eral government would not have power itself to operate or construct the
project. As to P. W. A. loans to municipalities co-operating with the water
power program by contracting to purchase federal hydroelectric power, the
further question arises as to whether, assuming the first contention is
rejected, the loan can still be attacked because the federal project producing
the power is declared to be unconstitutional. Judge Grubb restrained some
fourteen towns in Alabama from accepting P. W. A. loans on this very
ground.' 00 He held that generally speaking P. W. A. loans and grants for
the construction of local projects are within the spending power as a measure
in relief of national unemployment conditions, but that the Federal Emer-
gency Administration of Public Works was obviously acting in concert with
the Tennessee Valley Authority, and that the unconstitutionality of the
program and activities of the latter infected the loans of the former.
While this decision has been overruled by the Circuit Court of Appeals
on grounds already described, the point of view is interesting and may or
may not be adopted by the Supreme Court if it in turn should overrule the
97. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 8 F. Supp. 893 (N. D. Ala. 1934);
Missouri Public Service Co. v. City of Concordia, 8 F. Supp. i (W. D. Mo. 1934); Wash-
ington Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263 (D. Idaho 1934) ; Duke Power
Co. v. Greenwood County, io F. Supp. 854 (W. D. S. C. 1935). And see Review by Henry
T. Hunt, Esq., of cases attacking the constitutionality of Title II of the National Industrial
Recovery Act and P. WA. A. loans made thereunder, issued by the Administrator July 29, 1935.
Prentice-Hall, Federal Trade and Industry Service (2d ed. 1935) § 40024.
98. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1922).
99. Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22 (19o5); Madera Water Works v.
Madera, 228 U. S. 454 (1912) ; cf. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 291
U. S. 61A9 v934).ioo. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 8 F. Supp. 893 (N. D. Ala. 1934).
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Circuit Court of Appeals on the main point of the constitutionality of the
activities of the Authority. The issue of fact as to the existence or non-
existence of conspiracy or concerted activity between departments or agen-
cies of the federal government in executing separate and distinct statutes
could well be used, especially in later cases, as a pretext for avoiding unpop-
ular decisions.
Of course, accepting the premise that T. V. A. is illegal, the further
ruling against P. W. A. loans for the erection of local municipal outlets for
T. V. A. power is hardly important to the program as a whole. That premise
alone would defeat the program, for local loans have nothing to do with
federal water power except to round out the activities of the major projects
which produce it.
Assuming, however, that the activities of Tennessee Valley Authority,
or of any other similar enterprise of the future, are sustained by the Su-
preme Court, then the question of the legality of P. W. A. loans and grants
as a part of the water power program is simply the general question, already
discussed, of whether the spending power covers money advanced for the
purpose in question. In view of the previous policy of non-interference
adhered to by the Supreme Court in respect to expenditures authorized by
Act of Congress, it seems rather doubtful that those lower court rulings 101
which deny the power of the government to lend and grant for general wel-
fare purposes other than those specifically enumerated in the Constitution
can be affirmed, unless upon some such general finding as that of Judge
Grubb, to the effect that the government expenditures are a part of a larger
illegal program. Such decisions can be reversed on grounds which will not
necessitate an interpretation of the general welfare clause.102 It might be
held that even if the loans were unauthorized, the municipality would suffer
no loss and the private utility would have no standing to complain by reason
of such illegality. It would also be possible, in those cases where the local
plant is constructed with a view to consuming or distributing hydroelectric
power produced by a federal project, to regard the loan and grant for its
construction as incidental to the constitutional power upon which the federal
project is based. Inasmuch, however, as a federal project, such as the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, can only be sustained as itself incidental to the
commerce, or some other specific, power, the latter view seems unsound
because it pyramids one incidental power on another. At all events, there
are logical and practical grounds for believing that federal financing as a part
of the water power program is reasonably secure so long as the major fed-
eral projects are upheld.
ioi. Missouri Public Service Co. v. City of Concordia; Washington Power Co. v. City
of Coeur D'Alene, both supra note 93.
io2. Cf. City of Allegan v. Consumers Power Co., 7, F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
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It is interesting and curious to note that the conservative policy of
combining a 55 per cent loan with each 45 per cent grant furnishes a handy
weapon to those who oppose the program. Private utilities, and other
taxpayers in the locality, have an acknowledged standing to secure judicial
opinion on the legality of local borrowings and bond issues. The grant is
not only smaller than the loan, but is tied up with it as a part of the same
transaction, so that a decision against the loan, especially if on the ground
of lack of federal power, effectively obstructs them both. If the grant were
ioo per cent. instead of 45 per cent., the litigious taxpayer, as such, would
have a very doubtful standing in court.
Much has been and will be said concerning the alleged impropriety of
subsidized municipal competition where private capital has been invested in
good faith on the strength of valid franchises. But the destruction of pri-
vate utilities by such competition has been held to be neither an impairment
of the franchise contract, nor a taking of property without due process of
law.10 3 The fact that the municipal subsidy is reinforced by federal funds
alters the situation only if such federal financing is illegal in itself.
Conclusion
As times change and new and varying economic conditions arise, it is
natural to find a continuous record of struggle by conservative authorities
to prevent the enactment and enforcement of measures intended for social
betterment, but designed on patterns unknown when the organic law was
established. On the one hand, it is plain that progress itself shapes new
patterns in place of the old, and that no Constitution restricted in scope to
the subjects comprehended by its authors could be expected to outlive them
very long. On the other hand, there must be and are certain fundamental
principles inherent in the Constitution which are not the subject of com-
promise. The fear that the Supreme Court is abdicating its rule in favor of
political and popular agitations of the moment is inevitably voiced when
important decisions are liberal. Recent decisions, however, should set at
rest such groundless fears. When Congress oversteps the bounds, the Court
has no hesitancy in saying so, and its word is final. The fact is too often
overlooked that intelligent interpretation of organic law resolves itself nat-
urally and properly into a sincere effort to search out and define a justifica-
tion for new measures adopted by the legislative branch. The opposite, or
truly reactionary, approach would serve not at all in preserving the Con-
stitution and would simply encourage revolt.
Bearing all this in mind, and giving all benefit of doubt to the Admin-
istration, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the federal water power
program as a whole-as a federal enterprise and in its present form-is
1o3. Cases cited note 99, s=pra.
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constitutionally indefensible. In the discussion above emphasis and atten-
tion have necessarily been given to the technical rules in which judicial
opinion is couched. These rules often seem far removed from fact and
even from the legal merits of the question; but after all, the grounds on
which a decision is made are often concealed by those expressed in the
opinion. And legal comment can properly concern itself with the technical
concepts of which the opinions are composed, if only because historically,
at least, they have a direct relation to fundamental principles. Whether the
Supreme Court will employ one set of rules to uphold, or another to strike
down, the Tennessee Valley Authority depends on the views of the court
as to whether the act, and the activities thereunder, offend the fundamental
principles of our system of government. In forecasting those views, the
facility with which one set or another of technical concepts apply to the
facts of the case is some indication of what to expect. The rules which
would sustain T. V. A. and the rest of the water power program are, with-
out exception, difficult to apply to the facts..
The commerce power protects the program only so far as it is incidental
to the improvement of navigation. The war and defense powers seem
relevant to one project only, and to it only so far as its activities are inci-
dental to the manufacture of war products or the disposition of property
acquired during war time. The proprietary power is equally limited in its
application, and the general welfare power, unless it is to receive a long-since
discredited construction, is authority at most for the incidental features of
the program which are dependent for their existence on the validity of the
whole.
Fundamentally, the trouble would seem to be with the extent to which
the program involves federal participation in the various steps of producing
and distributing power. In the Boulder Dam case there was not-nor could
there have been-any evidence introduced of a general plan by a federal
agency to manufacture, distribute and sell electricity and take over the eco-
nomic development of the area. The production of power on any navigable
stream is subject to control by the Federal Power Commission. Boulder
Dam power, as leased, is also subject to the control of the Interior De-
partment, lessor. The difference is not essential. Under the present plan
of operation the federal government plays the part of an art~iter or stake-
holder for the various interests and communities within reach of the stream,
its own interest as builder and lessor being one of the largest. But the dam,
as completed, may well be compared with a natural resource or phenomenon,
belonging to the people and developed (operated) by private enterprise or
by the states under federal control.
The New Deal water power projects are not the same. The federal
government abandons the merely paternalistic role of a regulatory commis-
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sion or possibly of an inquisitive landlord, and assumes the role-through
corporate subsidiaries-of a competing unit in the industry. Its activities
go so far as to resemble a deliberate attempt to take over the industry as a
whole and make of it a federal function. It is this underlying element in
the water power program that renders its constitutionality so doubtful. If
the program were less ambitious, ways to sustain it would readily be found
and approved.
With modification of the present program, the place of the federal
government in the national power situation may well be made secure and
salutary. The construction of huge projects on great rivers need not be
left to private capital. But the time has not come for turning over the
electric light and power industry, like the mails, to an executive department
in Washington. So far as the present water power program directs itself
toward such an end, it is fundamentally offensive to the Constitution. It
is likely that no Supreme Court decision will sustain the full scope of activ-
ity of the Tennessee Valley Authority or similar federal corporate entities.1
04
104. An excellent and thorough consideration of the subject of this article will be found
in Note (1935) 48 HAMV. L. REv. 8o6. See also Nicholson, supra note 78; Note (1934) 48
HAxv. L. REv. 89.
